van Fraassen's Critique of Scientific Realism, On the Meaning of Theoretical Regularity

30 June 2020, Version 1
This content is an early or alternative research output and has not been peer-reviewed by Cambridge University Press at the time of posting.

Abstract

Skepticism won’t suffice as a method for making theoretical representations about the validity of knowledge. The contents of ideas must pave the way to processes that provide foundations of ideas to determine paths for thought and conception to be confirmed. These paths are logically constructed in theories whose structures are based on observation. In order to determine what kinds of structures to use in the development of ideas, science is a method that contains specific principles that explain what logical relations there are between mind and the world. Thus, fallibilism is a way of being that decides how to order the logical relations of observation based on how they work in conditions and makes a step in another direction to say what factors are not reliable for the pursuit of knowledge.

Keywords

Theory
Science
van Fraassen
Leibniz
Peirce
Ontology
Induction
Hypothesis
Observation
Inference
Ambiguity
Order

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